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Ce credeau SUA despre Ceausescu in 1973: Singurul cal disponibil, incapatanarea si egocentrismul sau ar putea fi in avantajul Americii

10 Aprilie 2013
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Incapatanarea si egocentrismul lui Nicolae Ceausescu erau considerate de un diplomat american la Bucuresti, in 1973, drept posibile avantaje pentru interesul Statelor Unite ca Romania sa-si sporeasca independenta fata de URSS, potrivit unei telegrame diplomatice publicate luni de WikiLeaks.

„Desi exista romani care sunt mai atragatori pentru gusturile occidentalilor, Ceausescu este singurul cal disponibil (Ceausescu is the only horse available) si poate ca incapatanarea si egocentrismul sau sunt chiar avantaje pentru interesul nostru politic de a vedea independenta Romaniei inflorind si metinandu-se ca o forte pe termen lung, pentru o lume mai diversa”, afirma in noiembrie 1973 adjunctul ambasadorului SUA la Bucuresti, Robert Martens, intr-o telegrama transmisa Departamentul american de Stat inainte de vizita pe care dictatorul comunist urma sa o faca in SUA.

Acesta afirma ca, in ciuda tensiunilor interne si a vulnerabilitatilor externe, Nicolae Ceausescu era „liderul de necontestat al unui stat foarte disciplinat in care chiar si cei carora nu le placeau aspecte ale personalitatii si politicii sale il considerau indispensabil pentru propria lor dedicatie fata de independenta si modernizarea Romaniei”.

In aceasta telegrama, diplomatul american noteaza ca Romania era determinata, in materie de politica externa, sa-si sporeasca independenta fata de URSS, motiv pentru care „juca si cartea chinezeasca, alaturi de cartea americana si cea a lumii subdezvoltate”, evitand insa „socurile” care sa afecteze „egoul sovietic”.

In opinia acestuia, ar fi gresit sa se considere drept „neo-stalinista” personalitatea lui Ceausescu, in conditiile in care acesta nu dispunea de „puteri nelimitate” iar vechii lideri ai Partidului Comunist care il ajutasera pe acesta in lupta cu Draghici si Apostol erau departe de a fi „Yes-men-ii” dictatorului.
1. THE BROAD OUTLINES OF ROMANIAN FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC
POLICY ARE WELL ESTABLISHED AND WELL KNOWN AND DO NOT
REQUIRE REPETITION HERE. WE DO WISH, IN THIS MESSAGE,
TO COVER SOME OF THE HIGH POINTS OF THESE POLICIES, OF
ROMANIA’S POSITION AND PREOCCUPATIONS AS WELL AS THE
STABILITY OF CEAUSESCU’S POSITION ON THE EVE OF HIS TRIP
TO THE U.S. WHATEVER DIFFERENCES MAY HAVE ARISEN IN THE
LEADERSHIP DURING RECENT YEARS OVER SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF
ROMANIAN POLICY, WE BELIEVE THERE IS A HIGH DEGREE OF
CONSENSUS–VERGING ON UNANIMITY–CONCERNING THE ESSENTIAL
DIRECTIONS OF BOTH FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICY.

2. BASIC ELEMENTS OF ROMANIAN FOREIGN POLICY. IN FOREIGN
POLICY, ROMANIA IS FUNDAMENTALLY COMMITTED TO INCREASING
INDEPENDENCE FROM THE USSR AND TO GROWTH OF NATIONAL POWER
AND PRESTIGE WITHIN THE LIMITED RANGE AVAILABLE TO HER.
THERE ARE CERTAINLY NO OVERT SIGNS OF ANY VIABLE PRO-
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SOVIET ELEMENT THAT COULD THREATEN THE BASIC LONG-TERM
COMMITMENTS OF ROMANIAN NATIONALISM NOR DOES ONE HAVE
ANY SENSE FROM INTERMITTENT BUT NONETHELESS RATHER
EXTENDED CONTACTS WITH THE UPPER LEADERSHIP, THE SECONDARY
ECHELONS (CC MEMBERS, MINISTERS, DEPUTY MINISTERS, ETC.)
OR THE BROAD MIDDLE BUREAUCRATIC CLASS–MUCH LESS THE
PEOPLE–THAT THERE CAN BE MUCH DISSEMBLING ON THIS SCORE.
THE ROMANIAN STYLE OF FOREIGN POLICY IS ALSO FIRMLY EMBEDDED
IN LONG NATIONAL TRADITION AND CURRENT REALITIES AND ACCORD-
INGLY SELDOM GIVES RISE TO STRONG DIFFERENCES CONCERNING
THE OVERALL STYLE AND STRATEGY OF POLICY IMPLEMENTATION.
IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT ROMANIA MUST NOT SLAP THE SOVIETS
TOO HARD, TOO OFTEN, OR TOO OFFENSIVELY BUT THAT STRENGTH OF
PURPOSE MUST BE PRESERVED. THE CHINESE CARD IS PLAYED (AS
ARE THE AMERICAN, THE UNDERDEVELOPED WORLD ANDOTHER CARDS)
IN A RESTRAINED AND ORCHESTRATED WAY IN WHICH PROGRESS
TOWARD INDEPENDENCE IS GRADUALLY WIDENED BUT SHOCKS TO
THE SOVIET EGO ARE GENERALLY AVOIDED.

3. THE ROMANIANS PLAY THEIR FOREIGN POLICY GAME WITH
LONG-RANGE OBJECTIVES CONSTANTLY IN MIND AND WITH GREAT
PERSEVERENCE AND PATIENCE. SUCH ROMANIAN PLOYS AS THOSE
ON THE BALKANS, MBFR, CSCE, MIDDLE EAST „GOOD OFFICES,”
AND CEAUSESCU’S SEEMINGLY „GRANDSTANDING” STYLE OF OVERSEAS
JOURNEYS AND INTERVIEWS SHOULD BE SEEN IN THIS LIGHT;
THEY ARE NOT JUST WHAT THEY APPEAR TO BE–A DIRECT ENDEAVOR
TO OBTAIN A PARTICULAR OVERT OBJECTIVE–BUT PARTS OF A
SUSTAINED EFFORT TO GAIN GRADUAL ACCEPTANCE OF ROMANIAN
LONG-TERM NATIONAL AIMS. THERE PROBABLY HAVE BEEN BEHIND-
THE-SCENES DISPUTES ON SPECIFIC TACTICS AT TIMES AS WELL
AS PERSONAL RIVALRIES (CORNELIU MANESCU’S OUSTER, RUMORED
PERSONAL ANTAGONISM BETWEEN CURRENT FOREIGN MINISTER
MACOVESCU AND PARTY SECRETARY STEFAN ANDREI AND KNOWN IN-
FIGHTING BETWEEN SOME DEPUTY MINISTERS AND LESSER-FRY OVER
JURISDICTIONS) BUT THESE PROBABLY SELDOM MATERIALLY AFFECT
CEAUSESCU’S OWN RELATIONS WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF THE TOP
LEADERSHIP.

4. THE ONLY EXCEPTIONS TO THIS PATTERN OF BROAD HIGH-LEVEL
CONSENSUS IN FOREIGN POLICY ARE REPUTED DIFFERENCES OF
ASSESSMENT AS TO WHAT ROMANIAN IS GETTING OUT OF ITS „OPENING
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TO THE WEST.” PRIVATE STATEMENTS AND INNUENDOES TO US FROM
ROMANIANS THAT A SIGNIFICANT GROUP OF SENIOR ROMANIANS HAVE
BEEN CRITICAL OF EXCESSIVE OPTIMISM ABOUT ROMANIA’S ABILITY
TO TRADE WITH THE WEST SHOULD BE REGARDED AS PARTIALLY SELF-
SERVING PLOYS TO CONVINCE AMERICANS TO BE MORE FORTHCOMING
ON ISSUES LIKE MFN BUT WE DO FEEL THERE IS, IN FACT, SOME
TRUTH TO THIS PICTURE AND THAT THIS ISSUE HAS PROBABLY
BEEN A DIRECT OR AT LEAST INDIRECT ELEMENT IN LEADERSHIP
DISCUSSIONS. THESE DIFFERENCES ARE A MATTER OF DEGREE,
OF COURSE; ALL SEEM TO BE COMMITTED TO TRADE WITH THE WEST
TO SOME DEGREE AND ALL PROBABLY HAVE DOUBTS AND FELT DIS-
APPOINTMENTS ABOUT ROMANIA’S INABILITY TO ACHIEVE AS MUCH AS
CONTEMPLATED; AS IN MOST THINGS THE PROBABLE DIFFERENCES
ARE ONES OF DEGREE, EMPHASIS AND THE PRACTICAL CONCLUSIONS
DRAWN ABOUT METHODS OF HANDLING THE PROBLEM.

5. INTERNAL POLICY AND STRESSES. WE BELIEVE THERE IS A
LARGE ELEMENT OF CONSENSUS IN INTERNAL POLICY TOO ABOUT
BASIC DIRECTIONS BUT GREATER DIFFERENCES COME TO THE FORE
FROM TIME TO TIME ON TACTICS AND EMPHASIS, WITH PRIVATE
AMBITIONS AND RIVALRIES ALSO INTERMESHED WITH THESE FACTORS.
THE POSTULATES OF GENERAL CONSENSUS INCLUDE CONTINUED
DIVERSIFICATION OF THE ECONOMY, RAPID PRIORITY DEVELOPMENT
OF INDUSTRY, A VERY HIGH RE-INVESTMENT RATE WITH ITS
COROLLARY OF SHORT SHRIFT TO THE CONSUMER, HEAVY EMPHASIS
ON FOREIGN TRADE WITH THE WEST, TIGHT CONTROLS OVER THE
POPULACE IN VIEW OF THE UNDERLYING STRESSES CAUSED BY THE
ABOVE FACTORS, A COMMUNIST IDEOLOGICAL AND MORAL APPROACH
IN THEORY BECOMING HIGHLY PRAGMATIC IN PRACTICE WITH LITTLE
MORE THAN LIP-SERVICE GIVEN TO IDEOLOGY BY MOST (INCLUDING
MOST MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND OTHER HIGHER
PARTY ORGANS). THERE ALSO SEEMS TO BE A CONSIDERABLE
MEASURE OF AGREEMENT ON THE NEED FOR A DOMINANT PUBLIC
POSITION FOR ONE MAN (CEAUSESCU) IN ORDER TO DEMONSTRATE
UNITY AND PREVENT EXTERNAL MANIPULATION OF DIFFERENCES OR
POTENTIAL DIFFERENCES.

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51
ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SCI-06 SAJ-01 OMB-01 IO-14 ACDA-19

CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10

PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20 USIA-15 NIC-01 EA-11

NEA-10 EB-11 CIEP-02 STR-08 TRSE-00 COME-00 DRC-01

/188 W – 040002
R 201336Z NOV 73
FM AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7028

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 BUCHAREST 4258

6. DESPITE THIS GENERAL CONSENSUS OF APPROACH, THE LAST
FEW YEARS HAVE WITNESSED SUB-SURGACE CONFLICTS OVER A
WIDE VARIETY OF ISSUES, OF WHICH THE PACE OF RAPID
INDUSTRIALIZATION AND PRESSURE ON THE POPULACE SEEMED TO BE
THE MOST RECENT AND SERIOUS BONE OF CONTENTION. THESE
DIFFERENCES HAVE FADED INTO THE BACKGROUND IN THE LAST
YEAR, HOWEVER, PARTLY BECAUSE CEAUSESCU HEMSILF RETREATED
FROM THE FOUR-AND-ONE-HALF YEAR SLOGAN WITH WHICH HE
APPEARED TO BE ALMOST OBSESSED IN MID-1972, AND PARTLY
BECUASE THE LEADERSHIP IS AWAITING THE RESULTS OF THE THIRD
PLAN YEAR AS A PRELUDE TO THE MANEUVERING THAT WILL PROBABLY
BEGIN THEREAFTER IN PREPARATION FOR THE ELEVENTH PARTY
CONGRESS. MANY LEADERSHIP CHANGES ARE NOW LONG OVERDUE, IN
FACT, AND AT LEAST SOME OF THEM SHOULD BE RESOLVED NEXT YEAR.
THERE REMAINS MUCH THAT WE DO NOT KNOW ABOUT THESE INTERNAL
DYNAMICS OF POWER, OF COURSE, INCLUDING RECURRING EVIDENCE
OF DIFFICULTIES CENTERING ON THE SECURITY ORGANS, WHICH
HAVE EXPERIENCED EXTENSIVE AND REPEATED TURNOVERS AT THE
TOP SINCE 1971.

7. CEAUSESCU’S POSITION AND THE „PERSONALITY CULT.” IT IS
EASY BUT IN OUR VIEW MISTAKEN TO LOOK ON ROMANIA AS „NEO-
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STALINIST” DESPITE SUPERFICIAL SIMILARITIES WITH STALINISM
FROM MANY ANGLES, INCLUDING THE POSITION OF THE TOP MAN.
CEAUSESCU, WE BELIEVE, DOES NOT HAVE UNRESTRICTED POWER
BUT MYST MANIPULATE AND MANEUVER IN A COMPLEX AND SHIFTING
INTERNAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT. LIKE ANY GOOD POLITICIAN,
THE POSITIONS HE ADOPTS ARE SOMETIMES A MERE TACTICAL STANCE
OF BALANCING BETWEEN DIVERSE PRESSURES (THE SUMMER OF 1971,
NOTABLY THE „IDEOLOGICAL” CAMPAIGN THEN, WAS A GOOD EXAMPLE)
WHILE AT OTHER TIMES HE HIMSELF IS ESSENTIALLY A COMBATATIVE
ADVOCATE OF A SPECIAL POSITION–EVEN AN UNPOPULAR ONE–AS
SEEMED TO BE THE CASE ON THE FOUR AND ONE-HALF YEAR PLAN
COMPLETION ISSUE LAST SUMMER.

8. ALTHOUGH PERHAPS SYMPTOMATIC OF FUNDAMENTAL INSECURITIES,
AN OVERALL SOURCE OF STRENGTH–DESPITE ITS SUSCEPTIBILITY TO
RIDICULE–IS THE SO-CALLED PERSONALITY CULT. WE THINK
THE NEED TO ELEVATE CEAUSESCU IS RECOGNIZED BY ALL (OR AT
LEAST MOST) OF THE TOP LEADERSHIP TO PROTECT FROM ATTACK
BOTH THE FOREIGN POLICY GOALS AND AMBITIOUS INTERNAL
PROGRAM MENTIONED EARLIER. CEAUSESCU AND HIS CLOSEST SUP-
PORTERS HAVE PROBABLY ALSO USED THIS „CULT” TO DOMINATE
AND SILENCE OPPOSITION TO UNPOPULAR INTERNAL POLICIES
THAT CEAUSESCU PRESSES MORE THAN OTHERS–AND AS AN INSTRU-
MENT TO CONTINUE CONVERTING THE MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT
INTO A MORE PLIANT TOOL.

9. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE BELIEVE THAT MUCH OF THE OLDER
LEADERSHIP, ALTHOUGH THEY SUPPORTED CEAUSESCU AGAINST
DRAGHICI, APOSTOL AND OTHER RIVALS FOR THE POST GHEORGHIU-
DEJ SUCCESSION IN THE MID-1960’S, ARE FAR FROM CEAUSESCU
„YES-MEN” AND THAT CEAUSESCU HAS OCCASIONAL TROUBLE WITH
THEM ON SPECIFIC ISSUES. HE HAS ACCORDINGLY RELIED OR
ATTEMPTED TO RELY ON YOUNGER FOLLOWERS LIKE BURTICA AND
ANDREI WITHOUT INDEPENDENT PRESTIGE OR ORGANIZATIONAL
FOLLOWING IN THE LAST FEW YEARS, ESPECIALLY IN THE
SECRETARIAT, AND HAS PARTLY SUCCEEDED IN REDUCING THE
WEIGHT OF MORE INDEPENDENT MEN LIKE NICULESCU-MIZIL, MAURER
AND TROFIN THEREBY. IN THE MEANTIME, CEAUSESCU APPEARS TO
HAVE THE FIRM BACKING OF THE ENEMY
AND, INCREASINGLY, OF THE
PARTY APPARATUS UNDER PANA. HE APPEARS AS STRONG TODAY
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AS EVER ALTHOGH THE STRESSES CAUSED BY HIS PERSONALIZED
RULE, AND THE HARDSHIPS VISITED NOT ONLY ON THE POPULACE
BUT THE SECONDARY ELITE, COULD MAKE HIM VULNERABLE IN ROUGHER
POLITICAL SEAS, PERHAPS ORIGINATING IN DISPUTES OVER ECONOMIC
PROBLEMS.

10. CONCLUSIONS. DESPITE INTERNAL STRESSES AND EXTERNAL
VULNERABILITIES, CEAUSESCU COMES TO THE U.S. AS THE
UNDISPUTED LEADER OF A HIGHLY DISCIPLINED STATE IN WHICH
EVEN THOSE WHO DISLIKE ASPECTS OF HIS PERSONALITY AND POLICIES
REGARD HIM AS INDISPENSABLE TO THEIR OWN COMMITMENT TO
ROMANIAN INDEPENDENCE AND MODERNIZATION. NEVER FEELING
COMPLETELY SECURE IN EITHER THE NATIONAL OR PERSONAL SENSE,
HOWEVER, CEAUSESCU WANTS STRONGLY TO SHOW „SUCCESS” DURING
TRIPS LIKE THIS ONE AND ESPECIALLY TO QUIETEN SKEPTICAL
AND POTENTIALLY SKEPTICAL VOICES THAT ROMANIA’S EFFORTS
TO OPEN TO THE WEST–OR AWAY FROM THE SOVIETS GENERALLY–
ARE NOT SUFFICIENTLY REALISTIC. ALTHOUGH THERE ARE ROMANIANS
AROUND WHO ARE PERSONALLY MORE APPEALING TO WESTERN TASTES,
CEAUSESCU IS THE ONLY HORSE AVAILABLE AND PERHAPS HIS
VERY TOUGHNESS AND EGOCENTRICITY ARE EVEN ASSETS TO OUR
OWN POLICY INTEREST IN SEEING ROMANIAN INDEPENDENCE
FLOURISH AND CONTINUE AS A LONG-TERM FORCE FOR A MORE
DIVERSE WORLD.
MARTENS

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https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1973BUCHAR04258_b.html

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